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1 INTRODUCTION
Multicasting provides an efficient communication 
mechanism in both private networks and Internet for large- 
scale content distribution, such as audio and 
videoconference, web casting, interactive game and video 
on demand. There are three basic types o f  multicast routing 
protocols: distance vector, link state and shared trees (Miller 
1998). MOSPF belongs to the category o f link state (Moy, 
1994, 1998). MOSPF is also called dense-mode multicast 
routing protocol, because it requires some form o f flooding 
of datagrams to the network to find multicast routes. This 
protocol is suitable for areas with dense concentrations o f 
group members.
MOSPF is widely used in multicast but the security issues 
are still a concern where confidential and high value content 
are being transferred. Based on the properties o f the 
multicast, the components that should be secured include 
(Judge et al., 2003, Hardjono et al., 2000): multicast 
distribution tree protection, end-to-end data protection 
through cryptographic operations and member access 
control. The end-to-end data protection includes data 
integrity, source authentication and data confidentiality. The 
main method used to protect the data is group key 
encryption, in which the multicast traffic is encrypted with a 
symmetric key and all authorized group members are given 
the decryption key. Many schemes were proposed to 
provide the efficient re-keying for the group key 
management protocol (Hardjono et ah, 2000, Kruus et ah, 
1998). These methods can become very complicated 
because the membership is dynamic. In addition, as
mentioned in (Judge et ah, 2003), there are some other 
related issues where encryption o f  communications may not 
be possible for legal reasons; furthermore, even where data 
confidentiality is provided, it may be possible to do traffic 
analysis depending on the layer where encryption is done.
Because o f the above reasons, research was done to develop 
group access control schemes as an additional security 
mechanism (Hardjono et ah, 2000, Shields et ah, 1999, 
Judge et ah, 2002). In this paper, we propose a new secure 
multicast scheme and protocol for MOSPF based on an ID- 
based distributed encryption scheme.
The rest o f  this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the security architecture for multicast and the 
Internet Group M anagement Protocol (IGMP) and reviews 
the proposed member access control schemes. Section 3 
describes the M OSPF protocol architecture. Section 4 gives 
the novel distributed encryption scheme that is used in the 
scheme. Section 5 presents our new secure multicast 
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. Finally, in section 6, 
we give some concluding remarks.
2 SECURITY ARCH ITECTURE FOR MULTICASTING
This section briefly reviews security architecture, Internet 
Group Management protocol and related proposed work 
(Hardjono, et ah, 2000, 2002, Cain et ah, 2002, Judge et ah, 
2002).
The multicast security (MSEC) working group of the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) presents a multicast
security architecture reference framework. This Reference 
Framework is used to classify functional areas, functional 
elements, and interfaces.
There are three sets o f  functional entities and three 
functional areas. The three sets o f functional entities are the 
Policy Server, Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS), 
Sender and Receiver. The policy server represents both the 
entity and functions that is used to create and manage 
security policies specific to a multicast group. The Group 
Controller and Key Server (GCKS) represent both the entity 
and functions relating to the management o f  cryptographic 
keys used by a multicast group. The Sender is an entity that 
sends data to the multicast group. Based on the number of 
the senders, multicast is divided into two types, i.e. 1 -to -N 
and M-to-N, For the 1-to-N m ulticast type, only one sender 
can transmit data to the group. For the M-to-N multicast 
type, many or all group members can transm it data to the 
group. The three functional areas are Multicast data 
handling, Group key Management, and the Multicast 
security policies.
Our new secure multicast architecture and protocol for 
MOSPF will follow this reference framework.
2.1 IGMP Protocol
The Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) is the 
protocol through which hosts exchange information with 
their local routers. This protocol is specified in (Cain et al., 
2002). It is used by IPv4 systems (hosts and routers) to 
report their IP multicast group memberships to any 
neighboring multicast routers. IGM P lets a router keep track 
o f  IP membership on its local LANS by 2 types IGMP 
messages: sending IGMP host membership queries and 
receiving IGMP host membership reports. The IGMP has 
the following rules: firstly, host sends an IGM P "report" to 
jo in  a group; secondly, host does not send a report when it 
wants to leave a group; finally, multicast routers send IGMP 
queries to the all hosts group periodically to see whether any 
group members exist on their subnet works. I f  no response 
is received after a number o f queries, the router assumes 
that there is no group member on the network.
We note that the multicast provides an open group model. 
This open model has many beneficial aspects, but it also 
causes security issues, as it cannot control membership to a 
set o f authorized hosts. Security problems include 
eavesdropping, theft o f service, denial o f  service and 
possibly cryptanalysis. The next section will discuss 
possible solutions to addressing these issues.
2.2 Member Access Control Schemes
As mentioned before, the open group model properties of 
the multicast may cause serious security problems. On the 
other hand, the traditional methods used to 
cryptographically encrypt information cannot solve these 
problems. To solve these security problems, we need to
control the ability o f  hosts to join the multicast group. There 
are three functions required for multicast receiver access 
control. It includes group policy specification functions, 
access request functions and access control functions (Judge 
et al., 2002, 2003). The proposed solutions can be found in 
(Hardjono et al., 2000, Judge et al., 2002, Ballardie et al., 
1995). Depending upon the type o f revocation provided, 
these multicast receiver authorization solutions are 
classified into three types: centralized, ACL supported and 
time-limited processor. However, at each step o f  the way, it 
must decide which one is the next task to map: it maps 
‘more important’ tasks first when possible, where this is 
determined by the weight o f a node.
In (Hardjono et al., 2000), Hardjono and Cain present an 
approach that makes use o f the existing Group Key 
management protocol for host members of a group to 
deliver the IGMP keying material to the host and the 
multicast distribution tree to deliver the necessary keying 
material to the multicast routers. The receiver host sends a 
jo in  request including the access token to the router, and the 
router verifies the access token is in the token list. In 
(Ballardie et al., 1995), Ballardie and Crowcroft present a 
version o f IGMP that allows receivers to be authorized 
before joining the group. The architecture includes the 
group owner (the initiator), the authorization server, the 
routers and the receiver hosts. The group owner (the 
initiator) distributes the ACLs to the authorization servers. 
The receiver host sends a request to an authorization server 
to obtain an authorization stamp. When the receive host 
joins this group, it sends a join request to the router with this 
authorization stamp. Then the router forwards the receiver 
host’s request to the authorization server for approval. In 
(Judge et al., 2002), Judge and Ammar proposed a 
comprehensive architecture GOTHIC for providing group 
access control.
2.3 Gothic Architecture
In this section, we briefly describe the Gothic architecture 
proposed in (Judge et al., 2002). Our new scheme extends 
the Gothic architecture and provides a novel group key 
management scheme that enables the management o f 
multicast groups to be efficient. The Gothic includes two 
systems: the group policy management system and the 
group member authorization system (Figure 1). The group 
policy management system performs group policy 
specification functions. It includes three components: the 
group owner, the group owner determination and 
authentication system (GODAS), and the access control 
server (ACS). The group owner provides the security policy 
for the group and the list o f the authorized members to the 
ACS. The group owner determination and authentication 
system (GODAS) provide the system to verify that the host 
is the group owner. The group member authorization system 
carries out access request functions and access control 
functions. This system involves the interaction among the 
host, the router and the ACS.
G ro u p  Policy „ 
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Figure 1 Gothic Architecture
This system works as follows. First, the group owner 
contacts the ACS, and the ACS performs the authentication 
and authorization. Then the group owner provides the group 
policy to the ACS. Next, the receiver hosts request a 
capability from the ACS. These capabilities are identity 
based and time limited. After this, the receiver host can send 
a join request along with the capabilities that it received 
from its ACS to the router. The router host authenticates the 
receiver host and verifies the capabilities. Finally, the 
receiver host is allowed to join the group.
3 MOSPF (MULTICAST OPEN SHO RT PATH FIRST) 
ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we will briefly introduce the MOSPF 
architecture (Moy 1994) Figure 2 shows a sample a MOSPF 
configuration (Nx-the network, RTx-the router, M-the 
member, H-the host, number is the cost from the routers to 
network).
Figure 2 MOSPF Architecture
MOSPF is an extension to OSPF unicast routing protocol. 
OSPF routers use link state advertisements (LSAs) to 
understand all available links in the network and route 
datagram along least cost paths. MOSPF includes multicast 
information in OSPF link state advertisements (LSAs) to 
construct multicast distribution trees. All MOSPF routers 
maintain an up-to-date image o f the topology of the entire 
network. The path of the multicast datagram depends on 
both the datagram's source network and destination 
multicast group. Group membership LSAs are flooded
throughout the OSPF routing domain so MOSPF routers can 
compute outgoing interface lists. The MOSPF routers use 
the Dijkstra algorithm to compute shortest path tree for each 
group.
Each MOSPF router in the distribution tree for each 
source/destination combination bases its forwarding 
decision on forwarding cache. A forwarding cache entry is 
built from local group database and datagram's shortest path 
tree. The local group database records the group 
membership o f  the router's directly attached networks. This 
local group database is built from the Internet Group 
Management Protocol (IGMP). In multi-access network, 
one router is selected as Designated Router (DR); this 
Designated Router originates a network links advertisement 
on behalf o f  the network and becomes adjacent to all other 
routers on the network. The router updates the local group 
database when the membership state is changed. The 
datagram's shortest path tree depicts the intermediate hops 
taken by a m ulticast datagram when it is sent from the 
source to the individual group members. This shortest path 
tree is built on demand. It is built by using the router-LSAs 
and network-LSAs in the link states database and having the 
source network as root. The branches that do not include the 
router and transit networks are pruned from the tree.
For our new secure multicasting protocol, we need to add 
the encryption key into the LSA control messages, so that 
all the routers can store the encryption key to verify the 
prospective members.
4 KEY GENERAT IO N  ALGORITHM
Our approach involves the proposal o f a dynamic group key 
management scheme that enables secure and efficient 
updating o f  group members. We achieve this by 
constructing a public key that is associated with several 
associated private keys. Our proposal for secure 
multicasting is based on our earlier work on key distribution 
described in (Mu, et al., 2004)
4.1 System Set up
The Group controller and key Server (GCKS) need to set up 
the system such that all necessary parameters can be used 
during the multi-group services oriented application lifetime. 
GCKS selects the following parameters:
• a large prim e p  = 2q + 1 where q is also prime,
• an additive group G] and a multiplicative group G2 
(both have order p),
• a master secret key s e  Z, and
• a number P g  G,.
Based on the ID-based encryption algorithm (Boneh, et al., 
2001), the KDC computes the system public key Ppuh = sP 
which is then sent to all membership who have registered
with KDC. KDC also selects two strong public one-way 
functions H r. {0,1}* - > G | an d //? : G! -»{0, 1}*
4.2 Membership Registration
Any users who want to join the multicsat group have to 
register to the GCKS and become a member. We suppose 
that there is a secure channel between each user and the 
KDC. The user applies to jo in  the group including his/her 
ID. The KDC authorizes a privileged user by send him/her 
with private key SID -sQ iD (Q1D = H ^ID )). After registration, 
user becomes membership.
4.3 Algorithm Construction
This scheme consists o f  the following 3 steps: Encryption 
Setup, Encryption and D eception.
Encryption Setup
In order to deliver multicast services to corresponding 
members, the GCKS or sender needs to setup the following 
parameters.
Select a random number r e Z .
•  Compute R =  rP
•  Compute Xj = e (rQIDi, Ppub).
Where 6 is the Weil pairing mapping.
• Compute the following polynomial function
Then we can obtain:
«.-n 
ai = £ r. i n
a » - >  =  I
” 1
Note that {aj} satisfy ^  = 0 mod p , j  = 1 , -  ,m
Construct the corresponding exponential 
functions{a0P , a tP , a 2P ,••• ct„P} = {P0, Plt P2, -  P J
Encryption
Let M k e {0, 1}* be the multicast session key (TEK), then 
we can encrypt it as follows.
• Select a random number R e  Z  and a random 
number D e G | .
•  Compute (m+2) tuple
T <- { R , M  © H  2{ D ) , D  + kPt , k P l t -  , k P m)
= ( R , M  0  H  2 (Z) ), C 0 , C,  , C m )
•  Broadcast T  to Multicast group
Decryption
When the members received the T, they can decrypt the 
correspondent session key (TEK) as follows.
KSmi,K) = x, 
c o + E X‘CJ =D + k(ao +«!*/+ — + amx? ) P - D
J=1 C ® D =Mk
If  a member does not register to the multicast group, s/he 
will not decrypt the session key. Therefore s/he could not 
get the session key. This is because for any Xj not belonging 
to multicast group, £ ” =0 aj xj ^0 mod p.
5 A NEW  SEC U R E  MULTICAST ARCHITECTURE FOR  
MOSPF
In this section, we will present our new secure multicast 
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. This scheme is based 
on the algorithm described in last section.
As we discussed before, traditional methods are still prone 
to threats such as eavesdropping, theft o f service, or denial 
o f service. The proposed solutions are inadequate for 
dynamic multicast group memberships. Our new secure 
multicast scheme for MOSPF is partl^ based on the Gothic 
architecture mentioned earlier; it includes two systems 
namely the group key and policy management system and 
the group member authorization systems (Figure 3).
Figure 3 Secure Multicast Architecture fo r MOSPF
5.1 Group Key and Policy Management System
Except for the group policy specification functions 
mentioned before in the Gothic system, the group key and 
policy management system also performs the access control 
key generation and group session key generation functions. 
The group key and policy management system involves 
three parts: the group owner (for example, Host3 in Figure 3 
the access control server (ACS) and the group owner 
determination and authentication systems (GODAS). The
Group
System
Group Key and Policy
Management
System
group owner generates group access control keys, group 
keys for the group. It also provides the list o f authorized 
members and other security policy for the group to ACS. 
The multicast security policy can be referred to (McDaniel 
et al., 2000}. The access control server (ACS) is used to 
verify and authorize the prospective member, and it also 
involves in the group member authorization system. The 
group owner determination and authentication systems 
(GODAS) can be used to verify that the host is the group 
owner (Judge, et al., 2002}. There are two different systems 
for providing such functionality,
The first solution makes use o f  group certificates (Figure 4). 
This is similar to traditional digital certificates.
Figure 4 Group Owner Certificates
The second solution is the use o f  a group ownership service 
(Figure 5). This service is a query/reply protocol based 
service. It works in 4 different multicast environments. It 
includes the multicast address allocation architecture 
(MAAA), the source specific multicast (SSM), GLOP, and 
Session Announcement Protocol (SAP) /  Session 
Description Protocol (SDP).
Figure 5 Group Owner Service
5.2 Group Member Authorization System
Group member authorization system is the main part o f 
controlling access to the group. This system performs the 
access request and access control functions. It allows a 
prospective group member authorized to become a group 
member. This system involves three components: a 
prospective member host, a router and the access control 
server (ACS). We assume that the presence o f  a public key 
infrastructure, otherwise we can use the digitally sign 
messages method (Judge et al., 2002).
The group owner generates the distributed encryption key 
set {aj} and decryption key (siD), as discussed in the
preceding section. We also assume that there is one access 
control server (ACS) for the convenience o f describing this 
protocol. The access control authorization protocol is 
described as follows.
5.3 Authorization Protocol
The group member authorization system includes the 
interaction between the host and ACS, and the interaction 
between the host and the router. This system also assumes 
the presences o f  the public key infrastructure (PKI).
• (K+h, K.h) denotes the prospective member hosts
public key and private key pair
•  (K+acs) K-acs) denotes ACS public key and private 
key pair.








0 4 Join ACK
Authentication
Figure 6 Basic Authorization Protocol
The interaction between the prospective member and the 
ACS includes the following (Figure 6):
1 H  -»  A C S  : A R  = [GID  , ID  , CERT K ] k t 
2. ACS  ->  H : AA  = CAP  = [IPH, DNH,G ID,SJ,CERTt „ a ]t_aa 
Here
AR  denotes authorization request
ID  denotes the prospective member ID
AA  denotes authorization acknowledgement
CAP denotes Capability
DNh denotes the host's distinguished name
GID  denotes the group ID
Sj denotes the member decryption key SiD
The interaction between the prospective member and the 
Router includes:
3 . H  R : JR  = CAP
4 .R  - »  H  : JA  =  Status  
Here
• JR  denotes join request
• JA denotes jo in  acknowledgement
First, the prospective member sends an authorization request 
to the access control server (ACS). This authorization 
request (AR) includes the group ID that the m em ber want to 
jo in  and his/her public key certificate, which is signed by 
his/her private key.
Second, the access control server authenticates the 
prospective member and decides if  this prospective member 
can be authorized by check the group policy from  the policy 
server. Then the access control server returns an 
authorization acknowledgement (AA). I f  the request is 
successful, the prospective member will receive the 
decryption key (s1D), which is encrypted with the 
prospective member’s public key.
Third, the access control server updates the encryption key 
set ({a;}) to ({aj}„ew)' As we discussed before, the system 
needs to change the related parameter for encryption. These 
can then be transferred to one o f the M OSPF routers as part 
o f  the link state advertisement (LSA) information. Based on 
the MOSPF routing protocol, all the routers o f  the area will 
store this information. We assume that the routing control 
messages are secure, which can use the OSPF digital 
signature (Murphy et a l ,  1997).
Finally, the prospective member sends the jo in  request to 
the router that is the designated router if  the prospective 
member connected network has more than one router. 
Because the router already has the distributed encryption 
key, the router can verify whether the prospective member 
is qualified. If  successful, the prospective member is 
accepted as a formal member.
5.4 Reauthorization and Revocation
The group member needs to refresh their membership state 
to coincide with the soft state o f  the IGM P group 
membership reports and o f  the routing protocol. In this 
scheme, the router can encrypt the control messages and 
only the qualified members have the decryption key in the 
group. The group owner can cancel the m em ber who has 
left by changing the encryption key. On the other hand, the 
member who has left can also rejoin the group; the group 
owner only need to change the encryption key. W e can see 
that this new scheme can achieve efficient revocation and 
reauthorization.
This new secure multicast architecture and protocol for 
MOSPF has the following advantages com paring to the 
previous proposals (Hardjono et al., 2000, Judge et al., 2002, 
Ballardie et al., 1995). First, this scheme simplifies access 
control protocol process by adding a group control 
encryption key into the MOSPF LSA control messages. 
This is because the access control server does not need to 
transfer the prospective member's certificates to related 
routers every time. Next, the scheme is flexible and the 
group owner can revoke a member at any time; other 
proposed schemes can not do this, whether they use a 
capability like token or a time limited token. Furthermore, 
our scheme is scalable, when the group is dynamic with
members joining and leaving. This is a major advantage of 
our scheme over the previously proposed ones.
In this scheme, we assume that the router is trusted and can 
receive group messages. One can easily envisage a slight 
variation o f  the scheme which uses a hybrid method by 
employing group session key and the group key 
management protocols to enhance the system and to achieve 
higher levels o f security.
6 CONCLUDING R EM A R K S
In this paper, we have presented a new secure multicast 
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. Our new scheme 
involves a novel distributed encryption scheme and 
simplifies the access control process. The proposed scheme 
has good scalability
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